

Message Text

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SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON OSI
RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS

CTB MESSAGE NO. 276

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI) RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. AT MEETINGS OF THE OSI WORKING GROUP THE DELEGATIONS HAVE SOUGHT TO DEVELOP A COMPOSITE TEXT. A NUMBER OF POINTS OF SUCH A TEXT HAVE BEEN AGREED AD REFERENDUM, BUT ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT POINTS THE SOVIETS ARE HOLDING TO POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THEIR MAY 25 DRAFT. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC ISSUES BEGINNING IN PARAGRAPH 6 BELOW IS KEYED TO THE COMPOSITE WORKING TEXT (CTB 277). END SUMMARY.

2. THE SOVIET POSITION. THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY GONE FAR TOWARD MEETING THE US AND UK POSITIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES. THUS THEY HAVE ALTERED THE POSITION THAT
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THEY HELD IN MARCH AND HAVE AGREED TO SET FORTH RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF OSI DESIGNATED PERSONNEL IN A TECHNICAL ANNEX RATHER THAN REFER THE MATTER TO THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. THEY ALSO HAVE AGREED TO LIST BASIC EQUIPMENT THAT DESIGNATED PERSONNEL MAY PROVIDE AND USE. THEY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TO BE SUPPLIED BY THE HOST PARTY, AND THEY APPARENTLY ALSO ACCEPT THE CON-

CEPT OF ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, TO BE AGREED IN ADVANCE OF AN OSI.

3. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A NUMBER OF MORE SPECIFIC ISSUES. THUS THE SOVIETS AGREE THAT THE PARTY CONDUCTING AN INSPECTION MAY BRING ITS OWN RADIATION-MONITORING AND METAL-DETECTION EQUIPMENT. THEY AGREE THAT PHOTOGRAPHY SHOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN OSIS AND THAT SOME KIND OF POSITION-FIXING SYSTEM IS NECESSARY. THERE IS ALSO FULL AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING BASIC EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY EITHER PARTY.

4. AREAS OF SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT INCLUDE THE USE OF PORTABLE SEISMOMETERS AND MICROPROCESSORS; PROCEDURES FOR TAKING AND DEVELOPING PHOTOGRAPHS; PROCEDURES FOR SPECIFYING AND SUPPLYING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT; TYPE OF POSITION-FIXING EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES FOR SUPPLYING IT; AND PROCEDURES FOR AGREEING ON ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. ON THE LAST TWO ITEMS, THE DEGREE OF DIFFERENCE IS NOT FULLY KNOWN SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET STATED THEIR POSITION CLEARLY.

5. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SOME CONCESSIONS, THEY ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN LIMITING THE INTRUSIVENESS OF OSIS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. TO THAT END BEZUMOV, SOVIET SPOKESMAN IN THE OSI WORKING GROUP, HAS SAID REPEATEDLY
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THAT OSIS ARE REALLY UNNECESSARY TO DETER OR DETECT VIOLATIONS BECAUSE NO TREATY PARTY WILL VIOLATE THE TREATY. THE UTILITY OF OSIS ACCORDING TO BEZUMOV IS TO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION, AND ON THIS PREMISE OSIS SHOULD BE STRUCTURED AS COOPERATIVE EXERCISES IN WHICH THE INTERESTS OF INSPECTING AND INSPECTED PARTIES ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME--TO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION. BEZUMOV HAS ALSO PRESSED FOR CLAUSES DESIGNED TO GIVE THE USSR GREATER CONTROL OVER OSIS ON ITS TERRITORY TO PREVENT INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING UNRELATED TO THE OSI. FOR THIS REASON HE HAS ARGUED THAT THE HOST PARTY SHOULD CONTROL ALL PHOTO TAKING AND PROCESSING. A SIMILAR CONCERN SEEMS TO UNDERLIE HIS OBJECTIONS TO LETTING THE INSPECTING PARTY BRING ITS OWN MICROPROCESSOR. A MORE DETAILED COMMENTARY ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IS GIVEN BELOW, KEYED TO THE COMPOSITE WORKING TEXT SENT SEPTEL.

6. NUMBERS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL AND DURATION OF OSI (PARAS 1 AND 2). THESE ISSUES HAVE BEEN PUT ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING. US/UK DELEGATIONS CONTINUE TO FAVOR 30 PERSONNEL FOR 30 DAYS, WHILE SOVIETS FAVOR 15 PERSONNEL FOR 20 DAYS.

7. EQUIPMENT (PARAS 3 AND 7). AS NOTED ABOVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED THAT RADIATION-MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND METAL DETECTORS ARE BASIC EQUIPMENT AND MAY THEREFORE BE PROVIDED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY TYPES OF EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR ALL OSIS, AND THAT ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT, NOTABLY SEISMOMETERS AND A MICROPROCESSOR, ARE NOT BASIC AND THEREFORE

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SHOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. THE SOVIETS CONCEDE THAT SEISMOMETERS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, AND AT THE JULY 24 MEETING BEZUMOV INDICATED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE US WAS NOT PROPOSING AN UNREASONABLE NUMBER OF SEISMOMETERS FOR AN OSI BUT MERELY FOUR OR FIVE. NEVERTHELESS, HE ARGUED THAT SEISMOMETERS SHOULD BE A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO A MICROPROCESSOR AND GRAPHICS TERMINAL WERE CLARIFIED IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION AFTER THE JULY 24 AND 27 MEETINGS, WHEN BEZUMOV SAID THAT THE HOST PARTY COULD NOT BE SURE THAT COMPUTING FACILITIES WERE NOT BEING USED FOR PURPOSES UNRELATED TO THE OSI. HE SEEMS TO BE SAYING THAT A MICROPROCESSOR MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IF IT WERE UNIQUELY LINKED TO THE DATA-COLLECTING EQUIPMENT SO THAT IT COULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSES.

8. THE SOVIET TEXT OF PARA 7 OF THE COMPOSITE TEXT LEAVES

UNCLEAR THE PROCESS OF DECISION REGARDING WHAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT THE HOST PARTY WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN OSI. THE US TEXT (LIKE THE PNE TREATY) WOULD OBLIGATE THE HOST
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PARTY TO PROVIDE WHATEVER SUPPORT EQUIPMENT THE REQUESTING PARTY SPECIFIED. IN ADDITION, THE US TEXT CONTAINS A LIST OF SPECIFIC ITEMS.

9. THE US DELEGATION IS EXPLORING WITH THE OTHER DELEGATIONS A POSSIBLE PACKAGE OF SOLUTIONS OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARAGRAPHS ON EQUIPMENT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE RESTRICTING BASIC EQUIPMENT COVERED BY PARAGRAPH 3 TO RADIATION EQUIPMENT, METAL DETECTORS, SEISMOMETERS AND THE MICROPROCESSOR AND GRAPHICS TERMINAL (TOGETHER WITH CALIBRATION AND POWER EQUIPMENT, CABLES AND SPARE PARTS); ADDING IONIZATION DETECTORS TO RADIATION EQUIPMENT BUT DELETING THE OPEN-ENDED WORD "INCLUDING" IN THAT PORTION OF TEXT; DESCRIBING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IN GENERAL TERMS RATHER THAN BY LISTING EXAMPLES, BUT PROVIDING THAT THE INSPECTING PARTY WOULD SPECIFY WHICH TYPES OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT WERE TO BE PROVIDED UNDER PROCEDURES DEVELOPED BY THE JCC TO ENSURE THAT THE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE OSI; AND ADDING A NEW PARAGRAPH WHEREBY THE HOST PARTY WOULD PROVIDE POSITION-FIXING EQUIPMENT AND MAPS OR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS WITH A SCALE OF 1:2500. BEZUMOV MADE A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL AT THE JULY 24 MEETING BY SUGGESTING THAT THE JCC PREPARE A GENERAL LIST OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND THE PARTIES AGREE ON SPECIFIC ITEMS FROM THE JCC LIST IN ADVANCE OF EACH OSI. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED TO THE US SUGGESTION OF A NEW PARAGRAPH ON POSITION-FIXING EQUIPMENT.

10. PHOTO PROCEDURES (PARA 4). DIFFERENCES OVER PHOTOGRAPHY REMAIN ESSENTIALLY AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. BEZUMOV CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE TO THE USSR OF CONTROLLING PICTURE TAKING AND PHOTO PROCESSING, SO THAT PHOTOGRAPHY WILL NOT BE USED FOR PURPOSES UNRELATED TO
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OSIS. HECKROTTE (US) HAS ARGUED, INTER ALIA, THAT DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE A GREATER INTEREST THAN THE HOST PARTY IN THE QUALITY OF THE PHOTOGRAPHY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPLYING EQUIPMENT AND FOR PHOTO PROCESSING. BEZUMOV HAS COUNTERED THAT PHOTOS OF POOR QUALITY COULD BE RETAKEN AND PROCESSED,

SINCE THE SUBJECTS WOULD BE "STATIONARY". SO FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AUTOMATICALLY-PROCESSED FILM AS REFERRED TO IN THE US BRACKETED TEXT.

11. PROCEDURES REGARDING EQUIPMENT (PARAS 5 AND 6). AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON PARAS 5 AND 6, DEALING WITH EQUIPMENT WHICH THE REQUESTING PARTY ELECTS TO HAVE THE HOST PARTY PROVIDE, AND WITH PROCEDURES FOR ASSURING A HOST PARTY THAT EQUIPMENT BROUGHT BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL CONTAINS NO SURPRISES. IN BOTH CASES, THE CONCEPTS ARE DRAWN FROM THE PNET PROTOCOL.

12. ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS (PARA 8 OF COMPOSITE WORKING TEXT). THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET COMMENTED ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUES RAISED BY THIS PARAGRAPH. IN THE PAST, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE OBJECTED TO LISTING SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS IN THE ANNEX AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO MENTIONING AERIAL SURVEYS. JOHNSON

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